MOSCOW, 29 February 2024. Russian Public Opinion Research Center (VCIOM) presents the findings of a monitoring survey devoted to how Russians view their country’s future.

Transparent future

The past years have been marked with consolidation within the Russian society, strengthening people’s unity and assurance that everything is going in the right direction in Russia. Russia’s prospects seem to also be less vague: 45% of Russians say they think that Russia’s future is predictable (46% in June 2023; 41% in 2022), which is a 9-point increase compared to 2021 (36%). On the contrary, the share of those who disagree with those who think that “our country has a predictable future” has decreased over the same period from 34% to 28%; the share of those who half agree (“partly agree, partly disagree”) has not changed much, with fluctuations within 21% and 23% over the entire period of measurement.

Four out of ten respondents say they can clearly visualize the future of Russia in five years (40%), whereas two years ago 35% could say the same (and only 28% three years ago). Every fourth respondent can picture the future of Russia only partially (25%); about the same percentage of respondents report their complete or partial inability to picture anything (26%, − 9 p.p. compared to 2021).

What is the image of future for Russia?

Three-quarters of Russians expect changes for the better in the near-term future (75%), including 40% of those who believe that in 8-10 years the situation in Russia will considerably improve and Russia will become a strong and thriving state; over the past six months the share of those who hold this viewpoint has increased by 9 p.p. (31% in June 2023). In other words, cautious optimism (“the situation is likely to improve”) gradually evolved into unshakable confidence that a bright future expects Russia. Almost every firth respondent expects deterioration in the situation in Russia (18%), including 9%, who think that tough times, up to a deep crisis, are yet to come.

Up until now there have been two competing viewpoints in the Russian society: one part of respondents expected Russia to become a great power within 15-20 years; the other part doubted it would come true. Those who think that Russia is already one of great powers were in the minority until 2014. Today half of Russians are confident that Russia is already a great power. Over the past eleven years the percentage of those who support this stance has increased five-fold: as early as 2013 ten percent of Russians called Russia a great power. Today almost every third respondent believes that Russia is likely to become a great power (30%). Thus, the total number of those who consider Russia a great power is 80%. Fifteen percent of respondents are skeptical about that (“unlikely to become a great power”), which is twice as small compared to 26% in 2020 and 2021.

Recipe for success is simple: we know where we are going to!

Currently the share of those who consider that the political leaders of the country have a long-term strategy of social development has hit a record high of 61% (57% in June 2023; 54% in 2022; 40% in 2021). Eighteen percent of respondents disagree with this stance (−11 p.p. compared to 2021); another 16% partially share this viewpoint, partially not.

According to every second Russian, most of their friends, relatives and acquaintances believe that Russia has a long-term goal and a clear vision of where to go (52% vs 29% three years ago). The share of those who disagree with this opinion has declined from 34% to 20% over the same period of time; the percentage of those who give an unclear answer (“partly agree, partly disagree”) has declined from 28% to 21%.

VCIOM-Sputnik Russian nationwide telephone survey was conducted 26 and 27 January, 2024. A total of 1,600 Russians aged 18+ took part in the survey. Survey method: telephone interviews, stratified random sample based on a complete list of mobile phone numbers in use in Russia. Data were weighted for social and demographic characteristics. The margin of error at a 95% confidence level does not exceed 2.5%. In addition to sampling error, minor changes to the wording of questions and different circumstances arising during the fieldwork can introduce bias into the survey.

Key effectiveness indicators, survey of January 26, 2024:  cooperation rate (CR)* = 0.7842; minimum response rate (MRR)** = 0.0170; response rate (RR)*** = 0.0852. Calculations are based on the corporate standard: https://profi.wciom.ru/principy_standarty/korporativnyj-standart-po-izmereniyu-rezultativnosti-oprosov-sputnik-vciom/

Key effectiveness indicators, survey of January 27, 2024:  cooperation rate (CR)* = 0.7704; minimum response rate (MRR)** = 0.0159; response rate (RR)*** = 0.0695. Calculations are based on the corporate standard: https://profi.wciom.ru/principy_standarty/korporativnyj-standart-po-izmereniyu-rezultativnosti-oprosov-sputnik-vciom/

* CR: the number of complete interviews divided by the sum of: а) complete interviews and b) non-interviews with eligible respondents.

** MRR: the number of complete interviews divided by the sum of: а) complete interviews, b) interrupted interviews after successful screening and c) all the respondents where it is unknown whether they meet the selected criteria or not.

** RR is calculated in the same way as MRR, with the only difference that the number of respondents with unknown eligibility decreases proportional to the percentage of eligible cases in the total number of respondents with identified eligibility or non-eligibility.

* January 2024 data are from the survey of January 27.

* January 2024 data are from the survey of January 26.

* January 2024 data are from the survey of January 26.