MOSCOW, February 2023. Russian Public Opinion Research Center (VCIOM) presents the findings of a survey on how the public mood has shifted over a year of the special military operation.
Assessments of the SMO results
The January data show that the decision to conduct the special military operation (SMO) in Ukraine is supported by a majority of Russians (68%); one out of five Russians do not support it (20%). Eighty percent of Russians consider the preliminary results of the SMO important to Russia. Another key marker of a “Donbass consensus” is positive attitudes towards the incorporation of the four regions into Russia (75% in October 2022).
All for the victory!
The general goal – successful completion of the special military operation – does not leave the Russians indifferent to the events on the battlefield. In January this year, 79% of Russians expressed readiness to help the inhabitants of the new territories and Russian soldiers, 74%, those who were mobilized, 72%, the refugees. About half of Russians help the residents of the liberated territories and Russian soldiers (55% choose at least one option from the list including supporting with money, foods, ammunition, etc); 36% assist the mobilized; 21% help the refugees.
Consolidation around the leader…
2022 was marked by the reinforced consolidation of the Russian society around the Russian president. This is confirmed by higher levels of trust in Vladimir Putin, compared to 2021, (78%, +13 p.p.) and higher approvals (75%, +15 p.p.). Another important indicator is the assessment of the legitimacy of the presidential work: the percentage of those who consider that Vladimir Putin is acting in the interest of a majority increased up to 73% in 2022 (+20 p.p.). An alternative viewpoint stating that V.Putin is acting on behalf of a minority was shared by one in five Russians (21%) by the end of 2022 (vs 40% in 2021).
…and other political consequences
Other political institutions (Government, State Duma and Federation Council) have also received higher assessments over the last year (+10-14 p.p. over a year). Their performance was approved by almost every second Russian (49%, 48% and 48% respectively).
Protest potential levels
Amidst the special military operation attitudes of Russians towards protest rallies have plateaued. Public protest potential hit its high in January-February 2022; one-fifth of Russians thought that mass protest actions were possible in their area (21%). A change in the public moods occurred in spring 2022: from April till the end of the year the indicator was fluctuating within 12-14%. Personal protest potential had decreased earlier – in March 2022. Whereas in February 18% of Russians showed their readiness to take part in protest actions, this percentage halved a month later (10%). This indicator did not exceed 12% till the end of the year.
New world order?
Views of Russia’s global position have considerably strengthened. In October 2022, 73% of Russians considered that Russia’s influence in international affairs was “likely big” (which is 11 p.p. higher than in 2021). Every fifth Russian said that the Russian influence globally was small (19%).
As to Russia’s global role in the next 15-20 years, positive views are also dominant. According to half of Russians, Russia has already won its status of a great power (51%, +20 p.p. compared to 2021). Another one-third of respondents believe that Russia is likely to become a great power (31%); 13% oppose them. The number of pessimists has halved over the period under consideration (26% in 2021).
The press release uses the data of the VCIOM-Sputnik Russian nationwide telephone surveys from January 2021 through January 2023. A total of 1,600 Russians aged 18 and older were surveyed on a daily basis. Survey method: telephone interviews, stratified random sample based on a complete list of mobile phone numbers in use in Russia. The data were weighted according to social and demographic characteristics. The margin of error at a 95% confidence level does not exceed 2.5%. In addition to sampling error, minor changes to the wording of questions and different circumstances arising during the fieldwork can introduce bias into the survey.
Do you support or not support Russia’s decision to conduct special military operation in Ukraine? (closed-ended question, one answer, % of total respondents) | ||
| 25.II.2022 | I.2023 |
Likely to support | 65 | 68 |
Unlikely to support | 25 | 20 |
Don’t know | 10 | 12 |
Speaking about some preliminary results of the special military operation, are the results achieved important or not important to Russia? (closed-ended question, one answer, % of total respondents) | |
| I.2023 |
Likely important | 80 |
Likely unimportant | 12 |
Don’t know | 8 |
How do you perceive the incorporation of Donetsk and Luhansk People’s republics and the liberated areas in Zaporozhye and Kherson regions into Russia? (closed-ended question, one answer, % of total respondents) | |
| X.2022 |
Definitely positively | 75 |
Likely negatively | 11 |
Indifferently | 12 |
Don’t know | 2 |
Which of the following have you personally happened to do / are you ready to do for people living in the new territories, Russian soldiers/mobilized persons /refugees to make their lives easier? (closed-ended question, any number of answers, % of total respondents) | ||
| I.2023 | |
| Those who have helped | Those who show their readiness to help |
Inhabitants of the new territories, Russian soldiers | 55 | 79 |
Mobilized persons | 36 | 74 |
Refugees | 21 | 72 |
Do you trust or distrust Vladimir Putin? (closed-ended question, one answer, % of total respondents; annual average) | ||
| 2021 | 2022 |
Definitely trust, likely trust | 65 | 78 |
Likely distrust, definitely distrust | 31 | 18 |
Don’t know | 4 | 4 |
Do you generally approve or disapprove of the performance of the Russian president? (closed-ended question, one answer, % of total respondents; annual average) | ||
| 2021 | 2022 |
Approve | 60 | 75 |
Disapprove | 29 | 16 |
Don’t know | 11 | 9 |
Speaking in general, in your opinion, does Vladimir Putin perform his duties as president in the interest of the entire society or a certain group of people? (closed-ended question, one answer, % of total respondents; annual average) | ||
| 2021 | 2022 |
In the interest of a majority, the entire society | 53 | 73 |
In the interest of a minority, a small group of people | 40 | 21 |
Don’t know | 7 | 6 |
Do you generally approve or disapprove of the performance of the Russian government? (closed-ended question, one answer, % of total respondents; annual average) | ||
| 2021 | 2022 |
Approve | 35 | 49 |
Disapprove | 30 | 19 |
Don’t know | 35 | 32 |
Do you generally approve or disapprove of the performance of the Federation Council? (closed-ended question, one answer, % of total respondents; annual average) | ||
| 2021 | 2022 |
Approve | 38 | 48 |
Disapprove | 34 | 22 |
Don’t know | 28 | 30 |
Do you generally approve or disapprove of the activity of the State Duma? (closed-ended question, one answer, % of total respondents; annual average) | ||
| 2021 | 2022 |
Approve | 35 | 48 |
Disapprove | 47 | 30 |
Don’t know | 18 | 22 |
In your opinion, what is the probability of mass protests against falling living standards, unjust actions of authorities in support of your rights and freedoms in your city/rural area? | ||||||||||||
| 2022 | |||||||||||
| I | II | III | IV | V | VI | VII | VIII | IX | X | XI | XII |
Highly likely | 21 | 21 | 18 | 13 | 13 | 12 | 12 | 12 | 14 | 13 | 13 | 12 |
Unlikely | 72 | 72 | 75 | 80 | 80 | 82 | 82 | 82 | 79 | 80 | 81 | 81 |
Don’t know | 7 | 7 | 7 | 7 | 7 | 6 | 6 | 6 | 7 | 7 | 6 | 7 |
If such mass protests take place, will you personally take part in them or not? (closed-ended question, one answer, % of total respondents) | ||||||||||||
| 2022 | |||||||||||
| I | II | III | IV | V | VI | VII | VIII | IX | X | XI | XII |
Likely yes | 17 | 18 | 10 | 10 | 11 | 11 | 11 | 11 | 11 | 11 | 12 | 12 |
Likely no | 76 | 76 | 84 | 84 | 83 | 83 | 83 | 82 | 82 | 83 | 81 | 81 |
Don’t know | 7 | 6 | 6 | 6 | 6 | 6 | 6 | 7 | 7 | 6 | 7 | 7 |
In your opinion, what influence does Russia have in international affairs today? (closed-ended question, one answer, % of total respondents) | ||
| 2021 | X.2022 |
Likely big | 62 | 73 |
Likely small | 26 | 19 |
Don’t know | 12 | 8 |
In your opinion, will Russia become a great power in the next 15-20 years, or not? (closed-ended question, one answer, % of total respondents) | ||
| 2021 | X.2022 |
Russia is already one of the greatest powers | 31 | 51 |
Likely yes | 29 | 31 |
Likely no | 26 | 13 |
Don’t know | 14 | 5 |