MOSCOW, 30 May 2022. Russian Public Opinion Research Center (VCIOM) presents the findings of a survey describing the attitudes of Russians towards Russia’s special military operation in Ukraine.
Over the recent three months public support for the special military operation has been stable: 72% of Russians support the decision to conduct Russia’s special military operation in Ukraine; 18% oppose it; 9% remain undecided.
Understanding of the goals has been the same too: mainly to protect Russia, to disarm Ukraine and not to allow NATO to deploy military bases in Ukraine (40%). One in five considers that the main goal is to change Ukraine’s political course and to denazify it (20%); 18% think the main goal is to protect the population of Donbas (DNR and LNR); 7% say that the main goal is to occupy Ukraine and incorporate it into Russia.
The protest mood levels have decreased by another 4 p.p. since March 2022: based on May 26 data, only 14% of respondents think that mass protests are likely to happen in the area (vs 26% in May 2021). Intentions to express personal protest have not changed compared to March: 11% of Russians would personally take part in protest actions; 84% are likely not to take part in protests if they take place.
Russian nationwide VCIOM-Sputnik surveys were conducted on February 25, 27, March 3, 17, 24, April 12, 24, May 12, 26, 2022. A total of 1,600 of Russians aged 18 and older took part in each survey. Results are based on telephone interviews. Survey method: telephone interviews using a stratified random sample based on a complete list of Russian mobile phone numbers. The data were weighted according to selection probability and social and demographic characteristics. The margin of error at a 95% confidence level does not exceed 2.5%. In addition to sampling error, minor changes to the wording of questions and different circumstances arising during the fieldwork can introduce bias into the survey.
25.II | 27.II | 03.III | 17.III | 24.III | 12.IV | 24.IV | 12.V | 26.V | |
Likely to support | 65 | 68 | 71 | 74 | 76 | 72 | 72 | 74 | 72 |
Unlikely to support | 25 | 22 | 21 | 17 | 15 | 19 | 20 | 17 | 18 |
Don’t know | 10 | 10 | 8 | 9 | 9 | 9 | 9 | 8 | 10 |
3.III | 17.III | 24.III | 12.IV | 24.IV | 12.V | 26.V | |
To protect Russia, to disarm Ukraine and not to allow NATO to deploy military bases in Ukraine | 46 | 46 | 42 | 43 | 39 | 42 | 40 |
To protect the population in Donbas (DNR and LNR) | 19 | 19 | 21 | 20 | 20 | 19 | 20 |
To change Ukraine’s political course, to conduct denazification | 18 | 17 | 18 | 17 | 18 | 18 | 18 |
To occupy Ukraine and to incorporate it into Russia | 5 | 5 | 4 | 5 | 5 | 6 | 7 |
Other | 8 | 7 | 8 | 10 | 11 | 8 | 9 |
Don’t know | 4 | 6 | 8 | 5 | 8 | 6 | 6 |
2021 | 2022 | |||||||||||||||
II | III | IV | V | VI | VII | VIII | IX | X | XI | XII | I | II | III | IV | V | |
Highly likely | 31 | 28 | 28 | 26 | 24 | 25 | 24 | 22 | 22 | 25 | 24 | 21 | 21 | 18 | 13 | 14 |
Unlikely | 61 | 64 | 65 | 66 | 68 | 67 | 68 | 70 | 70 | 67 | 68 | 72 | 72 | 75 | 80 | 79 |
Don’t know | 7 | 7 | 8 | 7 | 8 | 8 | 8 | 8 | 7 | 8 | 8 | 7 | 7 | 7 | 7 | 7 |
2021 | 2022 | |||||||||||||||
II | III | IV | V | VI | VII | VIII | IX | X | XI | XII | I | II | III | IV | V | |
Likely to take part | 14 | 16 | 16 | 16 | 16 | 18 | 18 | 17 | 19 | 20 | 20 | 17 | 18 | 10 | 10 | 11 |
Unlikely to take part | 81 | 79 | 78 | 79 | 78 | 76 | 76 | 77 | 76 | 74 | 73 | 76 | 76 | 84 | 84 | 84 |
Don’t know | 5 | 5 | 6 | 5 | 6 | 6 | 6 | 6 | 6 | 6 | 7 | 7 | 6 | 6 | 6 | 5 |