MOSCOW, 23 March 2022. Russian Public Opinion Research Center (VCIOM) presents the findings of a survey describing the attitudes of Russians towards Russia’s special military operation in Ukraine and the policies to decrease the negative effects of the sanctions on the Russian economy.
Seventy-four percent of Russians are inclined to support the decision to conduct the special military operation in Ukraine; there has been a nine-point increase compared to February 25th. Seventeen percent of respondents tend not to support the operation (an eight-point decrease compared to February 25th); 9% remain undecided.
Perceptions of the goals Russia is seeking to achieve have been the same over the recent two weeks. A majority of respondents consider that the main goal is to protect Russia, to disarm Ukraine and not to allow NATO to deploy military bases in Ukraine (46% of respondents). Other popular reasons are to change Ukraine’s political course, cleanse it of Nazis (19%), or to protect the Donbas population (17%). Five percent of respondents say that Russia’s main goal is to occupy Ukraine and incorporate it into the Russian territory.
Anti-Russian sanctions and protest moods
More than half of Russians believe that the policies the Russian government is carrying out to stabilize the economic situation domestically will likely help reduce the negative effects of the sanctions (61%); a quarter of respondents oppose this stance (24%). A further 15% remain undecided.
One in ten respondents would take part in mass protests if they take place in their city or area (17.III - 10%). Seventeen percent of Russians said in January they were going to take part in mass protests. A majority of Russians are likely not to participate in protests (17.III - 85%).
Based on the March 17th survey data, 18% of Russians say protests might take place in their place of residence; three quarters of Russians believe that mass protests are unlikely to occur (17.III - 75%).
Russian nationwide VCIOM-Sputnik surveys were conducted on February 25, 27, March 3, 17, 2022. A total of 1,600 of Russians aged 18 and older took part in each survey. Results are based on telephone interviews. Stratified dual-frame random sample based on a complete list of Russian landline and mobile phone numbers was used. The data were weighted according to selection probability and social and demographic characteristics. The margin of error at a 95% confidence level does not exceed 2.5%. In addition to sampling error, minor changes to the wording of questions and different circumstances arising during the fieldwork can introduce bias into the survey.
25.II | 27.II | 03.III | 17.III | |
Likely to support | 65 | 68 | 71 | 74 |
Unlikely to support | 25 | 22 | 21 | 17 |
Don’t know | 10 | 10 | 8 | 9 |
3.III | 17.III | |
To protect Russia, to disarm Ukraine and not to allow NATO to deploy military bases in Ukraine | 46 | 46 |
To change Ukraine’s political course, to conduct denazification | 19 | 19 |
To protect the population in Donbas (DNR and LNR) | 18 | 17 |
To occupy Ukraine and to incorporate it into Russia | 5 | 5 |
Other | 8 | 7 |
Don’t know | 4 | 6 |
17.III | |
Likely help | 61 |
Likely not to help | 24 |
Don’t know | 15 |
2021 | 2022 | |||||||||||||
II | III | IV | V | VI | VII | VIII | IX | X | XI | XII | I | II | 17.III | |
Highly likely | 31 | 28 | 28 | 26 | 24 | 25 | 24 | 22 | 22 | 25 | 24 | 21 | 21 | 18 |
Unlikely | 61 | 64 | 65 | 66 | 68 | 67 | 68 | 70 | 70 | 67 | 68 | 72 | 72 | 75 |
Don’t know | 7 | 7 | 8 | 7 | 8 | 8 | 8 | 8 | 7 | 8 | 8 | 7 | 7 | 7 |
2021 | 2022 | |||||||||||||
II | III | IV | V | VI | VII | VIII | IX | X | XI | XII | I | II | 17.III | |
Likely to take part | 14 | 16 | 16 | 16 | 16 | 18 | 18 | 17 | 19 | 20 | 20 | 17 | 18 | 10 |
Unlikely to take part | 81 | 79 | 78 | 79 | 78 | 76 | 76 | 77 | 76 | 74 | 73 | 76 | 76 | 85 |
Don’t know | 5 | 5 | 6 | 5 | 6 | 6 | 6 | 6 | 6 | 6 | 7 | 7 | 6 | 5 |